This Habeas is Unique

According to the Law this Habeas Petition now contains facts that must be accepted, absent a response from the US Government for over a year. The government does not deserve an 'extension', which is in fact what it would get if Idema and his men filed an amended petition.

A verified Habeas Corpus is considered factual on its face absent a sworn affadavit or answer by the respondent. The factual issues are now admitted absent any opposition.

In short: This petition should have been answered within 30 days as it would be in the case of an Al Qaeda terrorist like Jose Padilla. It was not.

Unlike most 2241 petitions, this petitions is unique. There are multiple petitioners, citizens of two different countries, one of which is the United States. There are multiple respondents and distinctly difference causes of action relating to completely different liberty interests denied by completely separate persons exercising separate control over separate and distinct issues. An overview of these separate issues and Respondents, or their agents, combined into one habeas corpus includes:

a. Respondent Khalilzad - who is outside the territorial jurisdiction of any U.S. Court, and not a resident of any U.S. district.
i. Khalilzad denies mail, familial relationships, water, medicine, and access to Afghan and U.S. courts.
ii. Khalilzad continues to be included because, although he is the current Ambassador to Iraq, he continues to exercise clear control over Hamid Karzai and ongoing liberty deprivations outlined in the Petition.

b. Ronald Neumann--who is outside the territorial jurisdiction of any U.S. Court, and not a resident of any U.S. District.
i. Neumann continues to deny mail, familial relationships, water, medicine, and access to Afghan and U.S. courts, on behalf, and as successor of, Khalilzad. Petitioners assert he is added, not substituted for Khalilzad.

c. Russel Brown - who worked at the direction of Khalilzad, and is a resident of Montana, not the District of Columbia.
i. Brown was the ministerial officers who exercised day to day control over the Petitioners' mail, and violated their liberty interest as set forth in the Petition.
ii. When Khalilzad was transferred to Iraq, Russel Brown continued to exercise day to day control over Petitioners in Afghanistan.
iii. Russel Brown still continues to exercise control and direction over Petitioners through his replacement, Adrianne Harchick.

d. Adrianne Harchick - who works at the direction of Neumann, and is a resident of New Jersey, not the District of Columbia.
i. Petitioners' claim against Harchick is that she is the ministerial officer who exercises day-to-day control over Petitioners' mail, and violates their liberty interests through illegal search and seizures, and denial of medical care, relief parcels, water, access to the Courts, and financial resources.
ii. Harchick exercises day-to-day control over Petitioners in Afghanistan.
iii. Harchick, as US Consul, is the most recent US official that stopped Petitioners' release by the Afghan government after they were found innocent by an appeals court, and upon information and belief, she did this at the direct request of Khalilzad and Neumann.

e. Robert Mueller - who is a resident of Virginia and outside the District of Columbia.
i. Petitioners' claim against mueller is for the rendition of Petitioners, illegal search and seizeure, and the intentional withholding of exculpatory evidence belgonging to the Petitioners and held at the FBI office in Kabul and New York.

f. Pasquale J. Damuro - ASD in charge of the FBI's NY Office, is a resident of New York.
i. Petitioners believe that Damuro now has the missing evidence in his control.
ii. Upon information and belief, Damuro has sealed indictments and/or warrants against at least one Petitioner, brought in the SDNY.

g. Kevin Thuman - Special Agent with the FBI Afghanistan Task Force, believed to be a resident of New York, and attached to the FBI's office in New York, New York.
i. Petitioners have prima facie evidence that Thuman has property and evidence in his possession which is the rightful property of Petitioners and is highly exculpatory in nature. That the illegal search and seizure of this evidence was in violation of Petitioners' liberty interests and that this evidence, or at least some of this evidence is in New York, New York.

I. Rule 60 Provides For Reconsideration Based on Mistakes

The SDNY Court ientered its Order Denying Respondents' Motion to Dismiss and transferring Petitioners' application for writ of habeas corpus to the District of Columbia on May 18, 2005, prior to receiving Petitoners' response.

Additionally, this Court stayed the Governments' response, ordered an amended petition filed, threatened to dismiss the Petition for failure to comploy with the rules of a "compliant" , and improperloy circumvented 2243, which requires an answer "within three days unless for good cause additional time, not exceeding twenty days, is allowed."

As stated in the text of the motion, Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures provides for the relief from a judgment or order based upon clerical mistakes, or errors arising from an oversight or omission by the court upon the motion of any party.

Additionally, Rule 60(b) allows for an order to be amended or reversed based on mistakes, such as inadvertence or exclusable neglect. On motion and upon such terms are just, the court may relieve a party from a final judgment, order, or proceeding.

Petitoners respectfully request this Honorable Court either render a decision on the merits and applicable law quoted in their Petition, or, in the alternative, treat this Response as a Rule 60 Motion, amend its Order of January 19, 2006, and transfer this case back to the SDNY. If treated as a Rule 60 Motion, Petitioners respectfully refer the court to:

Rule 60-Relief From Judgment Or Order

(a) Clerical Mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending may be so corrected with the leave of the appellate court.

(b) Mistakes, Inadvertence, Excusable Neglect []...etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party of a party's legal representative form a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons:

(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; ...
(6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.

The case clearly warrants expediting by this Court and the appointment of counsel for the unrepresented Petitioners to assist with that directive. The 16-month delay in the case has and continues to oppress and prejudice Petitioners, subjecting them to repeated daily violations of their Constitution rights by US officials, or Afghan officials acting solely on behalf of Respondents. O'Sullivan v. Boerckel 479, 119 S. Ct. 1728, 1732-33 (1999); Cater V. Estelle 677 F. 2d 427, 449 (5th Cir 1982) cert. denied 460 U.S. 1056 (1983) (holding petitioner's constitutional rights are violated [when] the state and the courts have been given their 'fair opportunity' to resolve and rectify the delays, protect petitioner's constitutional rights, apply the law as written and decided and/or act in the interest of justice, but is allowed to languish in perpetual action). Montgomery v. Meloy, 90 F.3d 1200, 1205, 1206 (7th Cir 1996); Carter V. Estelle supra, 677 F. 2d at 440 and 449 n. 16 & n.15 (futility exists when the prejudicial attitude of the court to petitioner's claims is a foregone conclusion). O'Sullivan, supra, at 1732 citing: Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249, 240-250, 92 S. Ct 407 (___) (a petitioner shouldn't even have to invoke these extraordinary remedies and write to the standard review process), Lowe v. Duckworth, 663 F. 2d 42, 43 (7th Cir 1981) (over 17 months w/no ruling). Harris v. Champion (aka Harris I), 938 F. 2d 1062, 1065 (10th Cir 1994) (cannot penalize petitioner when delays are not caused or condoned by petitioner).

Petitioners have alleged due process violations and have asserted a separate violation of denial of equal protection of law. This also includes Respondents' refusal to treat these US citizens incarcerated abroad as is required under Respondents' own DOS regulations, and comparable to how other US citizens incarcerated abroad are trated. Montgomery v. Meloy, 90 F.3d 1200, 1205-06, cert denied 117 S. Ct 266 (1996) (held that inordinate delays open door to equal protection violations). Chitwood V. Dowd, 889 F. 2d 781, 785 (8th Cir 1989) cert denied 495 U.S. 953 (1990) (where Petitioner "has made a continual good faith effort to bring his petition before the proper forum and has faced roadblocks at every turn" while the "actual time" of sentence rapidly elapsed thereby "potentially motting his claim", officials "disregarded" petitioner's rights).

We will take this document piece by piece and examine not only the law cited behind it but the flagrant audacity of the schlemiels who are running not only our courts, but who are railroading these men in a barely literate exchange of excuses in this ludicrous sequence of events.

Why is it necessary to cite chapter and verse from the law to Ori Lev and the rest who are taking down comparatively enormous salaries and are completely skirting these issues? Why does the law not matter to them? Why is it that the government does not take any of these laws for these Americans seriously in spite of case law which punctuates their case and their reasoning?



I keep coming back to it; this concatenation of events must end.

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